The sight of Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri and Chinese Ambassador Xu Feihong ceremoniously cutting a cake on April 1, 2025, to mark the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations between India and China, presented an image of calm and cooperation. Yet beneath this symbolic gesture lies a complex and contentious chapter in bilateral ties. The recent disengagement at the contentious border points of Depsang and Demchok has ushered in a tenuous detente, but the process and implications of this newfound normalcy raise more questions than answers.
From the outset of the 2020 Galwan Valley clash that left twenty Indian soldiers dead and resulted in a chilling freeze in India-China relations, New Delhi has made it clear that normalization of ties would be contingent on restoration of peace along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Despite this, India's decision to re-engage diplomatically amid ongoing border ambiguities indicates a shift in strategic posture. Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar's remarks in Parliament hint at a calibrated effort toward restoring pre-2020 conditions, while Army Chief General Upendra Dwivedi acknowledged on October 23, just two days after the latest agreement, that a degree of standoff remains unresolved.
So, what catalyzed this sudden thaw? Several geopolitical developments between July and October 2024 seem to have played a pivotal role. Notably, former U.S. President Donald Trump’s surprising offer to mediate between India and China during Prime Minister Modi's U.S. visit in February, coupled with interactions during the BRICS summit in Kazan, appear to have nudged both nations towards a pragmatic recalibration. Modi himself, during a marathon podcast with Lex Fridman on March 3, referenced his meeting with President Xi Jinping, affirming that a path to normalcy had begun and that full restoration to pre-2020 border dynamics would be a protracted process.
While such diplomatic overtures may appear promising, they conceal a host of contradictions and unresolved issues. The buffer zones established in areas like Pangong Tso and Galwan represent only temporary arrangements. Full disengagement, though ostensibly achieved in Demchok and Depsang, remains marred by a lack of transparency and clarity. Discrepancies abound: while the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) insists on continuity in strategic posture, China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi declared the October 21 agreement as a conclusive end to the border standoff and suggested delinking border issues from the broader relationship—a position India has previously rejected.
Compounding this ambiguity is the apparent softening of India's diplomatic language. New Delhi has gradually started to use terms like "border" in place of "LAC," and its calls for the "Return to Status Quo Ante" (RSQA) have been subtly replaced by terms such as "de-escalation" and "de-induction." These semantic shifts align closely with Beijing's long-standing preferences, which notably exclude commitments to deinduction or withdrawal to pre-2020 positions. This alignment may suggest a strategic compromise under the guise of diplomatic pragmatism.
The Indian government, meanwhile, has been notably circumspect in explaining its evolving stance to the public and Parliament. Parliamentary debates on the issue have been conspicuously avoided, citing national security and soldier morale. This refusal to engage in democratic oversight reflects a troubling trend toward opacity. Jaishankar, rather than acknowledging any intelligence or strategic lapse, has praised India’s "effective counter-deployment," a narrative that glosses over serious lapses in deterrence and operational readiness.
On the ground, the reality is starkly different from the official narrative. Despite government claims, it is widely believed that China has occupied approximately 2,000 square kilometers of territory that India once patrolled. In friction areas such as Depsang and Demchok, Beijing has not only suspended Indian grazing rights but also implemented coordinated patrolling mechanisms that limit Indian military mobility. Critical patrolling points among the 65 along the LAC remain inaccessible, severely hampering India’s ability to assert control over its claimed territory.
India’s initial response to the Galwan clash remains a point of contention. Prime Minister Modi’s declaration that "no one has entered our territory" gave China a significant diplomatic win by implicitly validating its claims. This narrative misstep continues to haunt India’s strategic credibility. Additionally, the banning of former Army Chief General M.M. Naravane’s book "Four Stars of Destiny" in December 2023 indicates the government’s unease with internal critiques. Naravane had highlighted the absence of clear political guidance during Operation Snow Leopard and revealed that critical decisions, such as whether to open tank fire, were left unresolved until the last moment.
Naravane's revelations underscore how India's strategic advantage on the Kailash Heights was lost due to indecision. Had clearer directives been issued, the disengagement dynamics might have been significantly different—perhaps even favorable to India. Instead, the ambiguity resulted in forfeiting control over tactically crucial areas. In March 2025, Naravane finally published a fictionalized version of his experiences in "Cantonment Conspiracy," offering a veiled critique of the indecision and lack of political-strategic alignment.
Experts like former Indian Ambassador to China Ashok Kantha have raised concerns over the adoption of buffer zones, a concept alien to previous border crises like Barahoti (1956) and Sumdorong Chu (1997), where mutual withdrawals without designated buffer areas were standard. The creation of buffer zones today, predominantly on Indian-controlled territory, represents a tangible shift in India's defensive posture and raises questions about sovereignty and territorial control.
Moreover, the ambiguity surrounding the WMCC (Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs) outcomes and their alignment with the MEA’s public statements highlights institutional dissonance. The 32 rounds of WMCC talks concluded that all 2020 issues had been resolved, yet Jaishankar admitted in Parliament that full disengagement had been achieved in only two areas. Such inconsistencies indicate either miscommunication within the establishment or a deliberate attempt to project success without fully achieving it.
In sum, the normalization of India-China relations in 2025 appears less a triumph of diplomacy and more a reluctant accommodation to geopolitical pressure and strategic constraints. The cake-cutting optics may celebrate 75 years of diplomatic engagement, but they conceal a fraught and unresolved reality. India now finds itself navigating a relationship marked by compromise and diminished strategic leverage. Whether this marks a temporary lull or the beginning of a more entrenched imbalance will depend on New Delhi’s ability to recalibrate its strategy, restore lost ground—both literal and metaphorical—and reassert control over its national narrative.
In a world where realpolitik trumps idealism, India’s challenge is not just to manage its border with China, but to do so without losing the confidence of its citizens and the coherence of its strategic doctrine. The illusion of normalcy, though politically expedient, may cost more in the long run than the crisis it seeks to obscure.
(the writer can be reached at dipakkurmiglpltd@gmail.com)