A
high-profile American delegation, led by Michael McCaul and Nancy Pelosi from
the US House of Representatives, recently visited Dharamshala, Himachal
Pradesh, where they met with the Dalai Lama. This meeting holds significant
geopolitical implications as it signals a shift in US policy towards Tibet. The
delegation conveyed a firm message that the United States no longer recognizes
Tibet as a part of China. They announced plans for the "Resolve
Tibet-China Act," which is expected to become law soon. During their
visit, the delegation prioritized meeting with the Tibetan spiritual leader
before meeting with Prime Minister Narendra Modi, underscoring their engagement
with the Tibetan government-in-exile. The Indian government welcomed the
delegation without hesitation, despite potential diplomatic repercussions with
China. This stance has resonated strongly in Beijing, where Chinese leaders
have historically asserted control over Tibet, tracing back to Mao Zedong's
claim of 'suzerainty' over the region.
The
Chinese claim over Tibet as a province and subsequent efforts to suppress its
culture, heritage, and language trace back to the aftermath of World War II.
The strategic decisions made during the war, such as allowing the Soviet Red
Army to enter and occupy Berlin first, inadvertently bolstered Stalin's
perception of Soviet dominance in post-war Europe. By 1949, the Soviet Union's
acquisition of nuclear weapons further solidified this perception, despite
their economic and military limitations beyond Eurasia. These historical events
set the stage for the geopolitical dynamics that continue to influence
relations in the region today.
The
United States' initial overestimation of Communist China during the mid-20th
century contrasted sharply with the perceived instability of Chiang Kai Shek's
Kuomintang regime on the mainland. Despite Mao Zedong's Maoists demonstrating
greater ideological commitment, this assessment didn't justify the exclusion of
Chiang Kai Shek's government and Taiwan from the United Nations. India, by all
accounts a more fitting candidate, was overlooked in favor of accommodating
Communist China's entry into the global stage. The Nehru government's steadfast
support for recognizing Red China's status highlights a significant diplomatic
decision, reflective of the complex international dynamics of that era.
For
years, the US State Department maintained a belief that the Soviet Union and
China operated as a unified communist bloc. It wasn't until the Sino-Soviet
conflict erupted along the Ussuri River in 1969 that the true depth of
animosity between the two communist powers became unmistakably clear. This
clash marked a pivotal moment, revealing the significant discord and strategic
rivalry that had long simmered beneath the surface of international communist
solidarity.
Following
the Sino-Soviet clash in 1969, President Nixon's historic visit to China in
1972 under the guidance of Dr. Henry Kissinger marked a turning point. This
diplomatic thaw significantly elevated China's global standing, paving the way
for Deng Xiaoping's transformative economic reforms focused on manufacturing
and exports. China's subsequent economic boom, fueled largely by exports to the
United States, underscored its newfound economic prowess. Amid these
developments, the US State Department had long overlooked the plight of
Tibetans under Chinese rule since 1959. The reasons for this neglect remain
unclear—is it due to ongoing tensions over Taiwan, or perhaps broader
geopolitical considerations yet to be fully understood? Time may shed light on
these intentions. India's stance in this dynamic has also been pivotal. While
leftist factions in the country swiftly advocated for recognizing the new
Chinese regime after its civil war victory, Deputy Prime Minister Sardar Patel
took a more cautious approach. In November 1949, he sought American counsel
through Charge d'Affairs Donovan to assess the urgency of recognizing Communist
China—an early indicator of India's nuanced diplomacy in a changing global
landscape.
Given
Sardar Patel's extensive correspondence with Jawaharlal Nehru regarding China,
his primary concern likely centered on ensuring mutual recognition of the
Sino-Indian border. However, Nehru, eager to move swiftly, informed the Chinese
of India's decision to recognize their regime in December of that year without
consulting the Sardar. This action underscored differing perspectives within
India's leadership on how best to navigate relations with the emerging
Communist power.
Upon
receiving Nehru's message of recognition, China also presented several
conditions. Firstly, India was to transfer all properties and assets belonging
to China to the new regime. Secondly, India agreed not to recognize any members
of the Kuomintang (KMT). Thirdly, India was expected to support the expulsion
of Nationalist China from the United Nations and endorse its replacement by the
communist regime. China's intentions reveal a calculated strategy, evident from
the communist regime's swift declaration of Tibet's "liberation" by
the People's Liberation Army just a day before the founding of the People's
Republic of China. This move followed the expulsion of the Chinese Amban by
Tibetans, despite his affiliation with the Kuomintang government.
The
Chinese accusation against India portrayed Nehru as a puppet of British
imperialism, alleging his role in the historical humiliation of China, a
narrative Mao aimed to reverse. China's People's Daily editorial criticized the
concept of suzerainty as oppressive, despite China's own historical demands
over Tibet. The editorial even urged the UN to scrutinize India's ties with
Bhutan. Despite warnings, including those from Ambassador K.M. Pannikar, the
Nehru government overlooked China's broader ambitions extending to Nepal,
Sikkim, and Bhutan. Nehru, known for his advocacy of global peace and unity,
remained unaware of these strategic maneuvers. The consequences were felt
acutely in Tibet and India alike.
(Views
are personal. Email: dipakkurmiglpltd@gmail.com)